Wednesday, April 21, 2010

U.N.’s ballooning $732 million Haiti peacekeeping budget goes mostly to its own personnel

The United Nations has quietly upped this year’s peacekeeping budget for earthquake-shattered Haiti to $732.4 million, with two-thirds of that amount going for the salary, perks and upkeep of its own personnel, not residents of the devastated island.

The world organization plans to spend the money on an expanded force of some 12,675 soldiers and police, plus some 479 international staffers, 669 international contract personnel, and 1,300 local workers, just for the 12 months ending June 30, 2010.

Some $495.8 million goes for salaries, benefits, hazard pay, mandatory R&R allowances and upkeep for the peacekeepers and their international staff support. Only about $33.9 million, or 4.6 percent, of that salary total is going to what the U.N. calls “national staff” attached to the peacekeeping effort.

Full Story: U.N.’s Ballooning $732 Million Haiti Peacekeeping Budget Goes Mostly to Its Own Personnel – FoxNews.com

Monday, April 19, 2010

UN based policy of doubling food production on 'flawed data'

The Soil Association says the suggested increase in food production is closer to 70%, rather than the UN's projected 100%

A declaration that global food production needs to double to feed the world by the middle of this century provoked shock when it was announced by the UN food chief. It has since become a founding pillar of food policy, cited by leading British politicians and government scientists,farming leaders and some of the world's biggest agricultural companies.

But the source of the now infamous statistic did not actually say that, claims a new report by the Soil Association, the UK's leading organic group.

The study, entitled "The big fat lie about doubling food production", traced the original source of the doubling claim back to a report published by the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation in 2006.

However, using the FAO's own figures, the Soil Association says the forecast increase needed in production would be closer to 70% by 2050.

The FAO itself also warns that the figures are distorted by using food prices: because meat and dairy products are worth more per weight, a small increase in volume appears as a significantly bigger increase in "production" measured in US dollars.

The differences between the report and the claims has arisen because politicians and others have used calculations from 2000, which are now a decade out of date, and then rounded them up, said the Soil Association, which is worried that the doubling figure is being used to push unsustainable industrial-scale farming.

"In abusing the figures government ministers and others are trying to exclude the possibility of us producing food in a way that would be good for the planet and good for our health," said Peter Melchett, the association's policy director.

The report also questions assumptions made in the FAO report concerning, among other things, high levels of food waste and billions more people eating western-style diets that are high in meat and dairy products, which have been linked to obesity, diabetes and other health problems.

"Instead of assuming a ghastly starvation and obesity vision of the future, what we need is food systems which feed everyone a healthy and decent diet," added Melchett.

The Soil Association study follows criticisms last summer [June 2009] by MPs on the Environment Food and Rural Affairs select committee, who warned that the forecasts were "projections rather than targets", and should be used to draw attention to other policies issues such as population growth, diet and waste. In its response in October 2009, thegovernment revealed that by recalculating the figures to begin from 2005-7, food production demand growth would be lower - up to about 70% by 2050. "The difference between 100% and 70% is not trivial: it is more than the food production of the whole American continent," added the government. "So claims around food production needing to increase 50-100% need to be treated with care."

Despite the government's partial back-down, however, the doubling figure, and that for a 50% increase by 2030, continue to be used by senior figures. Since October the old figures have been quoted by the Conservative farming manifesto; the government chief scientistProfessor John Beddington; former chief scientist Sir David King, who was advocating a "more open minded approach" to GM foods; and Peter Kendall, the president of the National Farmers Union in the UK. The doubling figure was also quoted at a conference in February by an executive at agri-chemical company Syngenta, according to an article in Farmers Weekly; and appears on the website of Monsanto, the global GM giant.

The purpose of the Soil Association report was to draw attention to the misleading use of the figures, said Melchett. "We can start to have a more sensible and open discussion about food and what farming systems are going to be possible in 2030 or 2050 when oil has started to run out and is very much more expensive, and how could greenhouse gases be lower," he added.

A major international report in 2008 by hundreds of scientists and other experts, commissioned by the FAO and the World Bank, also advocated a more varied response to feeding a growing population, including diversification of farms and diets, more conservation schemes on farms, reforming subsidies which encouraged unsustainable agriculture, and promoting more healthy diets. The report, under an organisation called the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development, was signed off by 58 countries including the UK, though the US, Australia and Canada only accepted part of the findings.

The FAO report, World Agriculture towards 2030/2050 says world food production growth would be principally driven by rising populations, and trends towards eating more calories and more meat and dairy products, especially in developing countries. As a result, the FAO forecast an average 1.5% a year growth in agricultural production by value from 1990 to 2030, and then 0.9% a year for the following two decades to 2050.

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

UN Workers in Haiti Live on Luxury Cruise Ship

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A Fox News report of April 8 notes that the UN is housing relief workers sent to Haiti to offer services following the nation’s devastating 7.0 earthquake on January 12 aboard two chartered luxury cruise ships. One of the ships has been dubbed the "Love Boat" by UN staff members.

The United Nations World Food Program announced on its website on March 19 that two UN-chartered passenger cruise ships, the Ola Esmeralda and the Sea Voyager, had docked in Port au Prince harbor.

But Fox noted that the website announcement did not disclose that the vessels were not intended to house homeless Haitian refugees, but would instead accommodate employees of the U.N. itself. The UN website also did not reveal that the cost of leasing the ships was $112,500 a day and that one of the vessels is owned by a company closely linked to the government of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez.

Yet another thing the the WFP failed to mention: Even U.N. staffers regularly refer to one of the ships as "the Love Boat" — an illusion to the old TV series about a cruise ship on which single passengers booked passage to look for romance.

When a Fox News reporter questioned Edmond Mulet, head of the Haiti peacekeeping contingent, about the organization’s judgement in housing so many U.N. relief workers in such luxurious surroundings while most residents of Port au Price are homeless, the official justified the decision as follows: “You have to be in good shape in order to help the Haitians.”

"It is the least we could do for them," said Mulet. "They are working 14, 16 hours a day. The place was pulverized. Living conditions are really appalling."

Fox News did some excellent research in determining that the registered owner of one of the two ships the WFP chartered, the Ola Esmeralda, is a Venezuelan company, Servicios Acuaticos de Venezuela, C.A., or Saveca. And Saveca, as stated on the company’s own website, is part of an "alliance," with Dianca, a Venezuelan shipyard, that is owned by the government of the Marxist Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez.

The entire Fox report, “With Haiti in Ruins, Some U.N. Relief Workers Live Large on 'Love Boat,’” which has links to the researcher’s sources, makes for interesting reading.

The worst-kept secret in Haiti: the UN's cruise ship hotel,” another online article about the UN-charter cruise ships posted on April 7 by Terra Daily’s staff writers, referred to a small office located in the UN’s logistics base in Port au Prince, where UN staff can sign up to stay on the Sea Voyager for a “heavily subsidized” rate of 40 dollars a night, including breakfast and dinner.

"It's the best deal in town," the report quoted a UN worker who told AFP on condition of anonymity, who said the usual rate should be around 150 dollars.

A UN coordinator who moved to the Sea Voyager after her house was destroyed by the earthquake told AFP she was happy because she had stopped working endless hours and sleeping in her office and that:

"Obviously some people are complaining because it is a long way away, 40 minutes by bus, but it's great, how can we complain, we have air-con, we have food, the mosquitos are under control.”

The report quoted Richard Morse, the owner of Port-au-Prince's Hotel Oloffson, who gave the following opinioin:

"If the UN is living on a cruise ship, it is the perfect metaphor for how they are viewed here in the country. If they think quake refugees should be living on cruise ships, then they should get cruise ships for the Haitian people, that's all I'm saying. Unless of course I am misinterpreting this and they really are better than Haitians."

Sarah Muscroft, the deputy head of mission for the UN's Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), offered the official reason that the ships were being used to house UN staff — because member states insisted on safe housing for staff.

"That is the reason why there is a boat here because the member states have basically said you have to have our nationals who work for you in non-prefab buildings," she said.

The story is not so surprising, considering that the UN and its agencies have become well-funded bureaucracies and have become subject to the excesses characteristic of all such bureaucracies. One could imagine the uproar if members of Christian relief agencies wallowed in luxury while the poor peasants were housed in tents and packing crates.

But the greatest danger presented by the UN is not that it’s staff members may prefer to stay on “The Love Boat,” instead of a shanty in Port au Prince. It is that the world body’s members states (including the United States) have consistently surrendered more and more of their national sovereignty to the UN, including control of their own national defense.

The process can only be reversed by the world’s nations withdrawing from the UN. The impoverished refugees of the world could be better served by private and church-based relief agencies.

Warren MassWarren Mass is editor of the Bulletin of The John Birch Society.

UN sinks $$ into Haiti 'love boat'


The United Nations is spending more than $10 million to house some of its Haiti relief workers on a pair of chartered cruise ships -- one of which has been dubbed "the Love Boat" by UN staff.

And some of the funds are going to a company closely linked to the government of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez, FOXNews.com reported yesterday.

National Review: The U.N. 'Love Boat'

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EnlargeiStockphoto.com

The World Food Program has rented out two passenger ships to accommodate many U.N. staff members off the coast of Haiti. At $112,500 per day, how much of these costs are passed off onto the U.S., the largest contributor to WFP.

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April 13, 2010

In a story posted last week on Fox News's website, George Russell laid out one of the most outrageous examples of poor judgment and profligacy seen in recent years from a U.N. organization. As Russell reports, two passenger ships (the Ola Esmeralda and the Sea Voyager) have been rented by the World Food Program — a U.N. humanitarian-relief organization — for $112,500 per day for the purposes of "accommodation for many of the U.N.'s international staff" off the coast of Haiti. The ships are also available to NGO workers and dignitaries such as Brazilian president Luiz Inacio da Silva, who recently visited the impoverished and earthquake-ravaged island. The total cost of renting these ships is projected to be over $10 million for the first 90 days. U.N. staff call one of the ships the "Love Boat."

Sensing that the news might not be received well, WFP quickly pulled down its own article (complete with pictures) about the ships. Russell preserved the story, however, and does a wonderful job of exposing the many questions surrounding WFP's decision to rent these ships. Among the highlights:

WFP is being overcharged, because the projected expense is millions of dollars more than what the ships would have been likely to earn through normal operation.

The Ola Esmeralda is owned by a Venezuelan company with close ties to Pres. Hugo Chavez.

Also included in the story is a revealing insight into the U.N. mindset. Russell asked Edmond Mulet, special representative in Haiti of the U.N. secretary general and head of the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) in the country, about the decision. Mulet's answer, spread through several quotes in the story, was shocking: "It is the least we could do for them. They are working 14, 16 hours a day. The place was pulverized. Living conditions are really appalling. . . . [When] oxygen masks come down in a falling plane, the first thing you do is put them on yourself. You have to be in good shape in order to help the Haitians."

Apparently, a visit to the Lido Deck is just the thing for staying in "good shape."

Russell reports that if the two boats are fully booked, the cost to WFP is $181.81 per passenger per day for the Sea Voyager and $154.25 per passenger per day for the Ola Esmeralda. But U.N. staffers get to stay on the ships for $40 per day, and those participating in the U.N. peacekeeping mission get to stay for $20 per day. So WFP, even if the ship is full, provides each U.N. "passenger" a direct subsidy of up to $161.81 per day. But WFP doesn't really pay for it, of course; the taxpayers in the countries who contribute to WFP do. In 2008, the U.S. gave over $2 billion to WFP — about 40 percent of its total budget.

And as if that weren't enough, American taxpayers pay roughly a quarter of the expense of U.N. operations and staff salaries — expenditures that include a Daily Subsistence Allowance for U.N. staff of $244 dollars. Reasonable people might wonder, given that their daily allowances would more than cover it, why WFP is not charging U.N. staff the full cost of staying on the ships rather than $40 or $20 per day. Such is the regard U.N. agencies have for our hard-earned tax dollars.

This is just the latest in a series of missteps by WFP. For instance, according to a March 2010 report by the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, "up to half of the food aid intended for needy Somalis is routinely diverted," and WFP food-aid delivery was dominated by three individuals (and their families and associates) linked to "arms sales and insurgent connections." A February 2010 story, also by Russell, detailed how WFP's relief effort in Afghanistan was inflated, with some outside experts saying that “some of the costs are more than 100 percent higher than they need to be."

Since the U.S. is by far the largest contributor to the World Food Program, Congress should take a keen interest in its activities in Haiti and elsewhere.

Sunday, April 11, 2010

How Corrupt Is the World Food Program?



How pervasive are the problems at the World Food Program, the largest hunger relief agency in the world and the United Nations agency responsible for food aid? It’s a $2.9 billion question—the amount of direct aid disbursed by the WFP. A significant part of its budget comes from U.S. contributors, and USAID coordinates some of its work through the WFP.

It’s been a month since the leaking of a scathing evaluation of WFP’sSomalian relief program written by the UN Monitoring Group onSomalia. The body, created by the U.N. Security Council, alleges that three Somali businessmen who held about $160 million in WFPtransport contracts were involved in arms trading while diverting the agency’s food aid away from the hungry. A New York Times report also claimed food was being siphoned off by radical Islamic militants and local UN workers.

Allegations had been simmering for months. The WFP suspended the contracts of the three businessmen but continues to deny there were serious problems. It has tried to frame the findings as unfounded or exaggerated. Speaking from WFP headquarters in Geneva, Executive Director Josette Sheeran said there was “zero evidence” for the allegations of a large-scale diversion of aid. “These estimates of diversion are not apparently based on any documentation, but rather on hearsay and commonly held perception,” the UN's aid chief in Somalia, Mark Bowden, wrote in the letter to the monitoring body. Bowden didn't provide his own estimate. The WFP said it would welcome an investigation.

Somalia is one of the most challenging places in the world for aid work, making the allegations difficult to verify. Food has to pass through roadblocks manned by insurgents and bandits. Investigators, who face the peril of kidnapping or even assassination, could end up relying on the people they are probing to provide for their protection.

Certainly an agency as large and diffuse as WFP—it has offices in 80 countries and provides food relief to 100 million people a year—is bound to have some problems. But questions remain as to how WFP executives monitor their vast network and how transparent and responsive they are when questions arise.

Somalia is not the WFP’s only controversy, only its most recent and most public. Its operation in Ethiopia, which is one of the largest recipients of food aid in the word, is reportedly in disarray, with the transport companies controlled by the country’s authoritarian government at the center of the controversy. According to the U.S. State Department, in 2008 only 12 percent of food aid (most of it overseen by the WFP) made it to its intended recipients in the poverty-stricken eastern region.

The trucking situation is little better in Afghanistan, where reports suggest that WFP is paying two to three times more than commercial rates, taking large chunks out of the $1.2 billion, three-year relief effort. The WFP has admitted that it inflated its shipping costs in North Korea by funneling business through dictator Kim Jong Il's government.

In each case the WFP has denied the magnitude of the problem. But the responses miss the point. Why hasn’t the WFP, which portrays itself as a model of transparency, opened its books so the international community can exercise appropriate accountability and oversight? And what actions are other international agencies requiring of humanitarian aid agencies to ensure transparency?

The Georgian Mess

The trucking situation is little better in Afghanistan, where reports suggest that WFP is paying two to three times above commercial rates, taking large chunks out of the $1.2 billion, three-year relief effort.

The problems with WFP food aid now coming to light are not isolated. I experienced them firsthand while in the republic of Georgia from 2008 to 2009, where I was the post-war aid monitoring coordinator of Transparency International Georgia. I was researching my doctoral thesis about aid accountability in a country where I myself had been an aid worker between 2002 and 2006.

The WFP had already been working in Georgia for several years when the brief but bitter conflict with Russia broke out in August 2008. Several days of intense fighting left hundreds of people dead. Nearly 130,000 Georgians were forced to flee their homes, suddenly displaced within their own country. Driven by strategic considerations and humanitarian concerns, international donors pledged to provide more than $4 billion in aid. One billion dollars of this money was pledged by the United States, making it the largest donor to Georgia. Millions of dollars were to be used to provide emergency food aid to tens of thousands of Georgians who had been affected by the fighting, including many who had been forced to flee their homes during the conflict and were now internally displaced.

In the wake of the conflict, WFP and numerous other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) started delivering emergency humanitarian assistance in addition to continuing work on their longstanding development projects. My research in Georgia revealed that the WFP, in cooperation with four international charities, used donor money to distribute insufficient, inappropriate, and in some case useless food rations to thousands of Georgians traumatized by war and displacement. As appears to be the case in Somalia, there was at best spotty oversight of the relief effort; also, to date, no one has been called to account.

In this case, the issue was not the transport infrastructure but the handling of the actual food rations. While most Georgians had been able to return home by the end of 2008, tens of thousands of people remained displaced and in need of support. Food aid was managed by the WFP and four aid agencies—CARE, the International Orthodox Christian Charities, Save the Children, and World Vision—all of which are still operating in Georgia. The food was delivered to people displaced by the conflict and to residents of the so-called “buffer zone,” a rural area where much of the fighting had taken place.

According to the U.S. State Department, in 2008 only 12 percent of food aid (most of it overseen by the WFP) made it to its intended recipients in the poverty-stricken eastern region of Ethiopia.

One of the key responsibilities of a food aid agency is to provide a daily minimum diet to prevent malnutrition and starvation. In Georgia, food rations were not adjusted upwards to account for the bitter winter, and therefore fell below globally accepted minimum standards, including those of Sphere, the guiding global humanitarian and disaster relief charter. Neither the Georgian government nor international donors realized thatWFP and the four NGOs were delivering food that fell short of the minimum needs of those who were enduring the harsh Georgian winter. As a result, aid recipients experienced a food gap until February 2009, when—in an unrelated development—the UN distributed credit-like cards to food aid beneficiaries so they could buy fruits and vegetables. It was supposed to supplement their wheat-heavy regular aid, but many of the recipients instead had to use these cards to bridge the gap left by WFP in their basic food needs.

The problems were compounded because the aid recipients had no way to communicate with WFP or its sister relief agencies. They had been provided with a nonworking hotline number that left Georgians helpless and frustrated.

While the quantity of food was clearly insufficient, the quality of the rations at times was even worse. In early 2009, using its global procurement system, similar to what was in place in Somalia, WFP purchased 1,800 tons of wheat flour from a supplier in Turkey and began distributing it. It could not be used to make Georgian bread due to a problem with the flour’s gluten index, although it technically met WFP standards. When people tried to bake bread, it turned hard, making it inedible. Mixing this flour with flour from other sources did not solve the problem. The absence of edible bread left thousands of people with a huge calorie gap.

Why hasn’t the WFP, which portrays itself as a model of transparency, opened up its books so the international community can exercise appropriate accountability and oversight?

The WFP and its partner NGOs were fully aware of the problem but downplayed its significance. “There is an issue with the gluten index which results in poor performance when bread is baked,” the WFP acknowledged in March 2008. “But since the flour is perfectly fit for human consumption,WFP is not planning to take back the distributed tonnages.” This statement flatly contradicted a qualifying line in the draft report that WFP kept from becoming public when the official report was released: “Anecdotal reports from the field suggest that some IDPs [internally displaced persons] are using the wheat flour as animal feed because they cannot use it to bake bread.”

WFP together with its NGO subcontractors continued distributing this flour for weeks. In total, 800 metric tons—equivalent to the flour content of 1.6 million individual daily rations—costing more than half a million dollars were distributed to tens of thousands of people before WFP finally ordered a halt.

The Accountability Gap

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has not yet responded to calls to authorize an independent investigation of the WFPoperations in Somalia or elsewhere. But everyone, even the beleaguered food agency, acknowledges there is a problem. Bowden, the Somalian aid director, said UN bodies have spent over $350,000 to improve monitoring in Somalia since 2008, and adopted other steps to limit risks in a “complex environment where a war economy has predominated for many years.”

What can the international community do to prevent the kind of problems that simmer in Somalia, Georgia, and other parts of the world that depend on international aid to feed the displaced and hungry? In theory, aid agencies are accountable to a variety of stakeholders, including private and institutional donors, their beneficiaries, the governments of the countries they work in, and the wider aid community. In practice, accountability is almost nonexistent because international standards either do not exist, are not enforced, or become victims of political crossfire. In Somalia, WFP has rejected one of the recommendations by the UN monitoring agency, to allow monitors to use UN Humanitarian Air Services to travel around the country. "The work of the monitoring group has been determined to be political in nature and therefore ... it would not be appropriate to make UNHAS flights available to them," Bowden said.

In practice, accountability is almost nonexistent because international standards either do not exist, are not enforced, or become victims of political crossfire.

The WFP has set up a firewall in Georgia as well. When I contacted them, the WFP and the four aid agencies refused to release the agreements governing their relationship—a violation of standards set by InterAction, an international coalition of humanitarian agencies, and of the Code of Conduct for NGOs in Disaster Relief (which WFP requires sub-contracting NGOs to follow). That made it impossible to determine how much aid money WFP pays to NGOs to distribute food.

Private donors in wealthy countries simply lack the information needed to hold aid and development NGOs to account for how their donations are used thousands of miles away. The only information available is that which is voluntarily provided by the NGOs, which are extremely reluctant to open their operations to scrutiny.

U.S. citizens concerned about the use of their tax dollars abroad may find it equally hard to discover how NGOs awarded grants by USAID are spending their money. I filed a Freedom of Information Act request with USAID in May 2009, requesting copies of all NGO project budgets financed with American taxpayers’ money during the second half of 2008. Almost a year later, USAID has still not released these documents.

Institutional donors like USAID usually do have a presence on the ground in developing countries, but they rarely directly monitor NGO activities in the field. Instead, they usually, though not always, rely on information provided by their grantees. Interviews with dozens of donor and NGO representatives in Georgia, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan suggest that neither NGOs nor donor country offices have an incentive to document instances in which aid money is stolen, wasted, or unwisely spent. Projects are almost invariably portrayed as successful, irrespective of realities on the ground.

Private donors in wealthy countries simply lack the information needed to hold aid and development NGOs to account for how their donations are used thousands of miles away.

Government officials in Somalia or Georgia are unlikely to try to hold theWFP or other international NGOs accountable for their activities. They lack the capacity to do so effectively and NGO projects typically do not receive funding from host governments. When the flour scandal finally made headlines in the Georgian media, the opposition quickly blamed the government rather than WFP, so the UN agency was never called to account.

The beneficiaries—the displaced and the hungry—are often caught in the middle. NGOs have a vested interest in presenting themselves as accountable to the needy to keep funds pouring in. But NGOs face no institutional pressures to meaningfully follow through on such commitments. They live off private donations and government grants, so being responsive to beneficiaries is irrelevant to organizational growth and survival.

Most Georgians receiving food aid come from villages and do not speak English. They do not know (and frequently do not care) which NGO delivers what aid. Whether intentionally or not, NGOs fail to identify themselves, don’t provide contact details, or leave beneficiaries in the dark about their entitlements. Georgian beneficiaries did not know when to expect the next delivery or even whether there would be a next delivery at all.

An Intractable Challenge?

Aid organizations have responded to concerns about their lack of accountability through a variety of initiatives and mechanisms intended to create transparency within the aid community. Senior staff members at NGOs’ global headquarters readily sign up to noble-sounding initiatives and commit their organizations to meeting certain standards. But these measures lack teeth and often require organizations to act as a whistleblower against a partner agency. As a result, they are almost universally ignored in practice. Few field-level aid workers are aware of the various commitments that their organizations have made, so they are not in a position to press for reforms.

Interviews with dozens of donor and NGO representatives in Georgia, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan suggest that neither NGOs nor donor country offices have an incentive to document instances in which aid money is stolen, wasted, or unwisely spent.

When issues do come to light, as in Somalia, agencies in the crosshairs invariably claim that the food relief program is largely helpful and successful and there will always be some problems in emergency response situations. The WFP notes it faces enormous challenges inSomalia, where more than 3 million people—or about half the population—suffer from malnutrition and need aid.

An independent investigation could be illuminating, but launching yet another NGO-to-NGO mutual accountability initiative likely would be fruitless. The problem is not a lack of standards and codes of conduct, but lack of enforcement and sanctioning of existing standards. Oversight by institutional donors such as USAID is inherently difficult because institutional incentives reward donor country offices for reporting successes and punish them for highlighting failures. Adding more of the same red tape, encumbering NGOs that are already drowning in bureaucratic requirements, could reduce the ability of committed NGO field workers to assist those in need, and would likely do little to address inefficiencies.

NGO project budgets are the single exception to this rule. USAID could require all grant recipients to post their proposed project budgets online before funding is released. These budgets already exist as part of the formal project proposals, so publicly revealing them would require negligible additional effort by NGOs. At a minimum, this would act as a constraint on some NGOs’ tendency to pay grossly inflated tax-free salaries to their international staff. However, as Transparency International Georgia’s experience has shown, any such initiative might be resisted by NGOs, and probably also by USAID itself, and is therefore unlikely to succeed in the absence of serious and sustained congressional pressure.

For the poor and hungry, the situation is daunting. Raising aid agency responsiveness towards beneficiaries may hold out the greatest hope of improving accountability in international aid. But exact mechanisms to make that happen are elusive. In order to have real effects, such transparency and disclosure must be backed by effective sanctions when the performance of aid agencies falls short of beneficiaries’ entitlements.

Till Bruckner is completing a PhD thesis on accountability and corruption in international aid to Georgia at the University of Bristol, United Kingdom. Jon Entine, co-director of Global Governance Watch and a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, helped write this account and added additional reporting.

FURTHER READING: Entine has discussed food security and crop research in “Green Revolution in the Balance.” AEI's R. Glenn Hubbard says it's time for “The Berlin Wall of Aid” to fall, while John Bolton unlocks “The Key to Changing the United Nations System.”

Image by Darren Wamboldt/Bergman Group.

Accountability in Aid

Aid Agencies, the United Nations, and Food Aid to the Republic of Georgia


By Till Bruckner


Till Bruckner has years of experience working with aid agencies in the Republic of Georgia and Afghanistan, including delivering WFP emergency food aid in Afghanistan. Between September 2008 and May 2009, he was the Aid Monitoring Coordinator of Transparency International Georgia. He is currently completing a PhD thesis on accountability and corruption in international aid to Georgia at the University of Bristol, UK. The views in this paper are those of the author alone, and in no way should be taken to reflect the position of Transparency International Georgia, the University of Bristol, or Global Governance Watch®. [tillbruckner@gmail.com]


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


In August 2008, the Republic of Georgia and Russia fought a brief but bitter war that made headlines around the world. Several days of intense fighting left hundreds of people dead. Tens of thousands of Georgians were forced to flee their homes and suddenly found themselves displaced within their own country. As Russian troops took up positions near Georgia’s capital and the republic’s economy teetered on the brink of collapse, the future of the Georgian state itself suddenly seemed in question.


The United States and the European Union were determined not to let Georgia disintegrate. The country has less than five million inhabitants, but it sits astride the only pipeline that directly links Caspian oil and gas fields with Western markets. Furthermore, the Bush administration had repeatedly hailed the Georgian government as a democratic success story and a key ally in the region.


Driven by strategic considerations and humanitarian concerns, international donors pledged to provide $4.5 billion in aid to Georgia. As part of the overall aid package, millions of dollars were to be used to provide emergency food aid to tens of thousands of Georgians who had been affected by the fighting, including many who had been forced to flee their homes during the conflict and were now internally displaced.

This report addresses the transparency and accountability of four aid agencies – CARE, the International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), Save the Children and World Vision – and the United Nation’s World Food Program (WFP) during their provision of food aid to conflict-affected people in the Republic of Georgia in 2008-2009. After a brief section providing some background information on food aid in general and the specifics of the Georgian situation, this study briefly presents three case studies:


1. The size of food rations distributed by the World Food Program (WFP) and four NGOs

2. The size of quality of food rations distributed by the WFP and four NGOs

3. An information hotline for aid recipients publicized by WFP


The report concludes that the UN and four charities used donor money to distribute insufficient, inappropriate and in some case useless food rations to thousands of Georgians traumatized by war and displacement without being subsequently called to account. The three case studies document how food aid delivery in Georgia breached the following four global standards governing emergency aid:


Sphere (Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response) standards (WFP and all four NGOs)

Humanitarian Accountability Partnership standards (CARE and World Vision only)

InterAction standards (CARE, IOCC, Save the Children, World Vision)

Code of Conduct for NGOs in Disaster Relief (WFP and all four NGOs)


The report concludes with a discussion of current accountability deficits in international aid.


BACKGROUND: FOOD AID AND GEORGIA


In the wake of the war between the Republic of Georgia and Russia in August 2008, at a conference in Brussels in October 2008,1 international donors pledged $4.5 billion in aid to Georgia2 to be disbursed over a period of three years. One billion dollars of this money was pledged by the United States, making it the largest donor to Georgia. Food aid, priced at $20 million for a six-month period, was only a small part of the overall aid package. The largest donor for food aid has been the US, followed by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and over a dozen other donors.


Georgia is unusual amongst aid recipient nations as it has a functioning government strongly supported by some Western countries and a comparatively good port, road and railway infrastructure. Georgian citizens differ from most aid beneficiaries in that they are universally literate, have access to the media, and have the possibility of holding their national government accountable through democratic elections. These factors make Georgia a best-case scenario for aid and development work.


The World Food Program (WFP), a United Nations agency that describes itself as “the world's largest humanitarian agency fighting hunger worldwide,” with around 10,000 employees providing food to more than 100 million people every year,3 had already been working in Georgia for several years when the war broke out. Dozens of international NGOs – including the four discussed in this study – also already had offices in the country. In the wake of the war, WFP and the NGOs started delivering emergency humanitarian assistance in addition to continuing work on their longstanding development projects.


In line with standard operational procedures, donors transferred funds for food aid to WFP, which then procured the food globally through tenders issued by its headquarters in Rome. (Donors may also directly provide WFP with food, rather than with cash, but this was rarely the case in post-war Georgia.) WFP headquarters organized delivery up to the Georgian border, while WFP’s Georgian country office was responsible for transport and delivery inside the country.


Around the world, WFP regularly subcontracts NGOs to deliver food aid directly to people in need. In Georgia, it sub-contracted four large international NGOs: CARE, the International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), Save the Children and World Vision. The food was delivered to people displaced by the conflict, and to residents of the so-called “Buffer Zone,” a rural area where much of the fighting had taken place. In total, the war had temporarily displaced over 130,000 people inside Georgia. While most of these had been able to return home by the end of 2008, up to 30,000 people are expected to remain displaced in the long term. As of March 2010, WFP and the four aid agencies discussed in this study are still working with conflict-affected people in Georgia.


CASE ONE: FOOD RATION QUANTITY


As an organization operating on a global level, WFP has a standardized approach towards food aid. Around the world, food parcels should contain the equivalent of 2,100 kilocalories (kcals) per day per beneficiary. In each country, parcels are adjusted according to the availability and price of food and beneficiary preference. In Georgia, WFP’s standard parcel – which may have varied occasionally due to breaks in the food supply pipeline4 – was heavily based on wheat products.5


Standard WFP food ration in Georgia



The Sphere project, which aims to improve the quality of assistance to people affected by disaster and to improve the accountability of states and humanitarian agencies, has developed a handbook that sets out minimum standards and key indicators for a variety of sectors within emergency humanitarian relief, including food aid.6 WFP was heavily involved in drafting the food standards section of the Sphere handbook.7

At first glance, the WFP food parcel makeup in Georgia seems to follow the 2,100 kcals per person per day basic global standards set by the Sphere project. However, the Sphere manual (pp. 189-191) clearly states that food rations must be increased if:


o “the mean ambient temperature is less than 20°C [68°F]” [and/or]

o “the mean body weight for adult males exceeds 60kg[132lb] and the mean body weight for adult females exceeds 52kg [115lb]”


The mean ambient temperature – inside beneficiaries’ dwellings as well as outdoors – during the snowy Georgian winter is well below 20°C (68° Fahrenheit). While relevant statistical data is not available, mean body weights in Georgia are above the benchmarks set by Sphere. Georgians’ minimum daily requirements therefore exceeded 2,100 kcals. However, during the winter of 2008-2009, WFP and its NGO sub-contractors, in a context of plentiful donor funding for emergency food aid and a fully functional national transport infrastructure, did not appear to meet the adjusted global Sphere standards that WFP itself had played a lead role in developing.


There are also questions whether the unadjusted food rations met the standards of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP),8 of which two of the four NGOs (CARE and World Vision) are members.9 HAP’s “principles of humanitarian action” include a commitment to “ensuring that humanitarian assistance meets or exceeds recognised minimum standards pertaining to the wellbeing of the intended beneficiaries.”


It appears that neither the Georgian government nor international donors realized at first that WFP and the four NGOs were delivering food parcels that fell short of the minimum needs of those affected by the war. The situation was not rectified until February 2009, when – in an unrelated development – the UN distributed plastic cards to food aid beneficiaries (see also below). With these cards, beneficiaries could withdraw a small monthly cash allowance for “supplementary food” to top up their rations. The supplementary food money, while welcomed, was not distributed to correct the problem of insufficient rations. It was already in the pipeline, intended to allow beneficiaries to buy some fruit and vegetables to top up their food packages with fresh produce. Instead, some beneficiaries had to use it to meet basic requirements such as flour and oil rather than buy fresh produce as intended. During meetings in Tbilisi, after the embarrassing incident became an issue, WFP argued that rations had been sufficient to meet minimum standards because people had this extra money. This turn of events was totally coincidental, however. Otherwise, the affected Georgians might still have been without sufficient rations the following winter.


CASE TWO: FOOD RATION QUALITY


Beginning shortly after the crisis began, the WFP began distributing wheat flour to the needy residents with no incidents. Then in early 2009, using its global procurement system, WFP purchased 1,800 tons of wheat flour from a supplier in Turkey and began distributing it. While the flour complied with WFP procurement standards and was theoretically fit for human consumption, it could not be used to make Georgian bread due to a problem with the flour’s gluten index. When people tried to bake bread using the newly procured batch of flour, they found that the bread turned hard, making it barely edible. Mixing this flour with flour from other sources did not solve the problem. The absence of edible bread left thousands of people with a huge calorie gap.


Despite being aware of the problem, WFP together with its NGO subcontractors CARE, World Vision, Save the Children and IOCC continued distributing this flour over a period of weeks. In total, 800 metric tons of the flour costing over half a million dollars were distributed to tens of thousands of people before WFP finally ordered a halt to the distribution.10 To put this figure into context, the 800,000 kilograms were the equivalent of about 20% of all tonnage distributed by WFP between the outbreak of the August 2008 war and the end of that year, and the equivalent of the flour content of 1.6 million individual daily rations.


The flour scandal briefly made headlines in the Georgian media on March 2, 2009, when members of the opposition Labor Party conducted a self-styled “monitoring visit” to a conflict-affected area. At a press conference, Paata Jibladze, Labor Party Executive Secretary, strongly criticized aid efforts, blaming the government for a variety of problems, including that of the useless flour. A few days later, the Anti-Crisis Council, a body created by the President of Georgia to oversee international aid, summoned the Minister for Refugees and Accommodation, Koba Subeliani, for a televised questioning. According to council staff, they were aware that the ministry had not actually distributed the flour (about which they had received numerous complaints from IDPs), but that they were trying to hold the minister accountable on the basis that his ministry had signed a memorandum of understanding with UNHCR in which the ministry accepted responsibility for coordinating aid efforts to IDPs.11 During the hearing, the minister denied culpability, saying that the flour had been distributed by the United Nations, not by his ministry. The Anti-Crisis Council then wrote a letter to UNHCR, asking it to clarify the flour controversy.12 Somewhat unsurprisingly, UNHCR never responded to this letter, as it had nothing to do with the matter.


The WFP and its partner NGOs were fully aware of the problem with the flour but downplayed its significance. WFP’s original draft for the minutes of a food security cluster meeting held on March 12, 2009, read:


“WFP mentioned the current wheat flour issue; while the quality and fitness for human consumption is good, there is an issue with the gluten index which results in poor performance when bread is baked. WFP is working on finding out more and on how to prevent this in the future. But since the flour is perfectly fit for human consumption, WFP is not planning to take back the distributed tonnages.”


When the draft minutes were circulated for review and comments on March 16, 2009, the author of this study replied to the responsible WFP staff member on the same day by email and suggested the following addition, based on comments he had made at the meeting itself:


“Anecdotal reports from the field suggest that some IDPs [internally displaced persons] are using the wheat flour as animal feed because they cannot use it to bake bread.”


WFP did not include the suggested addition in the final version of the minutes, published on March 20, 2009.13 Distributing food commodities that are technically safe to eat, but that beneficiaries in practice cannot use to prepare meals constitutes a clear violation of Sphere standards (pp. 157-163):


o “The food items provided are appropriate and acceptable to recipients and can be used efficiently at the household level.”

o “There are no complaints concerning difficulties in storing, preparing, cooking or consuming the food distributed.”

o “There are no verifiable complaints about the quality of food distributed... recipients’ complaints about food quality should be followed up promptly and handled in a transparent and fair manner.”


All four aid agencies working with WFP in Georgia quietly continued distributing the flour for many weeks after they had learned that beneficiaries could not properly use it to bake bread. This arguably violated several standards set out by InterAction,14 an umbrella association of aid agencies that CARE, IOCC, Save the Children, and World Vision all belong to. CARE and World Vision, members of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), also appear to have violated numerous clauses in HAP’s “principles of humanitarian actions”.

Even after the distributions were halted, and better quality flour was obtained and distributed, WFP never launched an additional distribution round to fill the gap it had left in people’s food supply, nor did it issue an explanation to the government or the intended beneficiaries. All four aid agencies working with WFP in Georgia continued distributing the flour long after they learnt that beneficiaries could not use it to bake bread.


CASE THREE: INFORMATION HOTLINE


In February 2009, WFP in collaboration with two other UN agencies issued plastic cash cards (see Case One) to food aid beneficiaries.15 In a press release, the UN agencies took credit for the cash transfer program, mentioning that it was being implemented “in collaboration with” the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation (MRA) and a second government agency. WFP had signed memoranda of understanding with both of them. The release further stated that “a special hotline is operating within the MRA to address questions that may arise during the Program implementation... posters and leaflets were printed and disseminated among the beneficiaries to ensure full visibility and transparency of the Program”. The release concluded with the contact details of all three UN agencies involved, but did not give contact details for the MRA.16


The posters and leaflets distributed to beneficiaries prior to issuing the cards prominently featured the logos of WFP and the other two UN organizations, but did not give any contact details for WFP or its sister agencies. Instead, the contact information provided to beneficiaries was that of an MRA telephone hotline, even though the UN knew, or should have known, that this hotline was understaffed and unable to handle a large amount of phone calls as it had been set up by the ministry with the help of the UN.17


Because the WFP did not provide its contact details to beneficiaries or set up an independent hotline, beneficiaries were not in a position to effectively file complaints if their entitlements to food were not met. The move confused beneficiaries as to who was actually responsible for executing the program. When problems emerged during flour distribution (see above), beneficiaries were unable to voice their complaints to WFP; the MRA hotline never became functional. As a result, the frustrations of those Georgians who became dissatisfied with the program’s implementation were redirected away from the responsible agency, WFP, and towards the MRA and the government.


DISCUSSION: AID AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY


In theory, international aid agencies are accountable to a variety of stakeholders, including private and institutional donors, their beneficiaries, the governments of the countries they work in, and the wider aid community. In practice, as the three case studies above illustrate, aid agencies are often not accountable to key stakeholders.


Accountability to Private Donors


Private donors in wealthy countries simply lack the information needed to hold aid and development NGOs to account for how their donations are used thousands of miles away. The only information available to small private donors is that which is voluntarily provided by the NGOs themselves, who are extremely reluctant to open their books to scrutiny. When contacted by the author of this study, WFP and the four aid agencies would not release the Field Level Agreements governing their relationship, making it impossible to determine how much aid money WFP pays to NGOs for distributing food. The four NGOs are required by the Code of Conduct for NGOs in Disaster Relief18 (which WFP seems to require sub- contracting NGOs to follow19) and by InterAction standards20 to grant public access to these agreements.


Accountability to Citizens of Donor Countries


US citizens concerned about the use of their tax dollars abroad may find it equally hard to discover how NGOs awarded grants by USAID are spending their money.21 The author of this study filed a Freedom of Information Act request with USAID in May 2009, requesting copies of all NGO project budgets financed with American taxpayers’ money during the second half of 2008.22 Nine months later, USAID has still not provided the requested budgets.


Accountability to Institutional Donors


Institutional donors like USAID usually do have a presence on the ground in developing countries, but rarely directly monitor NGO activities in the field. Instead, they usually, though not always, rely on information provided by their grantees. As the flour donation incident illustrates, this information may not always be fully reliable. (It is unclear to the author whether any donor actually noticed that the flour that was being distributed was nearly inedible.) Interviews with dozens of donor and NGO representatives in Georgia, Afghanistan and Tajikistan conducted by the author suggest that neither NGOs nor donor country offices have an incentive to document instances in which aid money is stolen, wasted or unwisely spent. Projects are almost invariably portrayed as successful, irrespective of realities on the ground.


Accountability to the Aid Community


Aid organizations have responded to concerns about their lack of accountability through a variety of initiatives and mechanisms intended to create mutual accountability within the aid community. Four such initiatives – Sphere, HAP, InterAction and the Code of Conduct for NGOs in Disaster Relief – have been touched upon in this study.23 At least in this instance, a comparison of NGO declarations on paper with NGO actions in practice reveals that these standards do not adequately guide NGOs’ operations on the ground. There are two main reasons for this:


1. These initiatives lack teeth. No participant in any of these initiatives has a vested interest in holding the other participants accountable for their actions. Membership organizations like InterAction often appear to be more focused on protecting their institutional interests and their members. In contrast, those who do have a substantial vested interest in holding NGOs accountable – people directly affected by aid projects – do not have the information or skills needed to hold aid organizations accountable through these initiatives. As the first two case studies suggest, even clear and explicit technical standards can be disregarded by NGOs without triggering adverse consequences.


2. Because these initiatives lack teeth, they are almost universally ignored in practice. Senior staff members at NGOs’ global headquarters readily sign up to noble-sounding initiatives and commit their organizations to meeting certain standards, but there is little subsequent follow-up. Few field-level aid workers are aware of the various commitments that their organizations have made.


Accountability to Host Governments


Host governments in developing countries rarely hold international NGOs accountable for their activities. Partly this stems from a lack of interest, as NGO projects typically do not receive funding from host governments. In the rare cases in which host governments do try to hold the UN and NGOs accountable, they frequently lack the capacity to do so effectively. As the flour incident illustrates, the government of Georgia, which is far more capable than most governments in the developing world, was unable to effectively take action on numerous complaints from citizens. While the literature on aid is full of examples of host governments trying to take credit for the achievements of international aid and shifting blame for failures to international actors, the case studies above suggest that sometimes the reverse can also be true.


Accountability to Beneficiaries


There is currently much discussion in the development field about the need to make NGOs accountable towards their beneficiaries. The three case studies presented here show that the rhetoric of ‘downwards accountability’ is not always paralleled by implementation in the field. There are two main reasons for this:


1. Aid organizations lack institutional incentives to make themselves accountable to beneficiaries. NGOs live off private donations and government grants, so beneficiary satisfaction is irrelevant to organizational growth and survival. NGOs have a vested interest in presenting themselves as accountable to beneficiaries in their publications in order to keep funds pouring in, but have no incentives to actually follow through on their words in a meaningful way. Beneficiaries have little to no power to influence NGOs’ actions.


2. Beneficiaries lack the information to hold NGOs accountable. For example, most Georgians receiving food aid come from villages and do not speak English. Faced with a confusing array of foreign acronyms written in an alien alphabet, they do not know (and frequently do not care) which NGO delivers what aid. Beneficiaries in Georgia were generally unaware of which organization had provided their food and who had delivered it. Equally, despite Sphere standards (pp. 162-178) explicitly mandating the provision of such information, beneficiaries did not know when to expect the next delivery, or whether there would be a next delivery at all. Whether intentionally or not, NGOs can skirt accountability to beneficiaries by failing to identify themselves, not providing contact details, or leaving beneficiaries in the dark about their entitlements.


CONCLUSION: ACCOUNTABILITY IN AID


This study has found that during the crisis in Georgia––a best-case scenario of a functioning government, a literate society, and considerable international media and donor attention–– international aid and development agencies often breached international standards governing emergency relief and lacked accountability. The UN and its partner agencies might very well respond to this assertion by claiming that the food relief program was largely helpful and that there will always be some problems in complicated emergency response situations. To put these events in context, however, it might be helpful to draw an analogy to what the media and policy response would be in the United States if the government had knowingly distributed 800 tons of inedible food to hurricane victims over a period of weeks.


That such problems do not happen more often is due less to residual safeguards in the aid system, but more to the strong personal commitment, dedication and integrity of many individual aid workers. Time and again, frontline aid agency employees manage to make a positive difference to the lives of people in need. Whenever aid delivered by NGOs ‘works’, it is often not because of, but despite, the sometimes dysfunctional aid system that these individuals have to work through.


Launching yet another NGO-to-NGO mutual accountability initiative likely would be fruitless. Many standards have already been formulated. The problem is not a lack of standards and codes of conduct, but follow-up, enforcement and sanctioning related to those standards that already exist. As the examples above suggest, oversight by institutional donors such as USAID is inherently difficult because institutional incentives reward donor country offices for reporting successes and punish them for highlighting failures. Adding more of the same by encumbering NGOs that are already drowning in bureaucratic requirements with even more red tape could reduce the ability of committed NGO field workers to assist those in need, and would likely do little to address inefficiencies.


NGO project budgets are the single exception to this rule. USAID could require all grant recipients to post their proposed project budgets online before funding is released. These budgets already exist as part of the formal project proposals, so posting them would require negligible additional effort by NGOs. At a minimum, this would act as a constraint on some NGOs’ tendency to pay grossly inflated tax-free salaries to their international staff. However, as Transparency International Georgia’s experience has shown, any such initiative might be resisted by NGOs, and probably also by USAID itself, and is therefore unlikely to succeed in the absence of serious and sustained Congressional pressure.


Raising NGO accountability towards beneficiaries may hold out the greatest hope of improving accountability in international aid. However, in order to have real effects, such accountability must be backed by beneficiaries’ ability to effectively sanction NGOs when their performance fails short of expectations.